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Abstract
We document that home ownership of households with \heads" aged 25{
44 years fell substantially between 1980 and 2000 and recovered only partially
during the 2001{2005 housing boom. The 1980{2000 decline in young home
ownership occurred as improvements in mortgage opportunities made it easier
to purchase a home. This paper uses an equilibrium life-cycle model calibrated
to micro and macro evidence to understand why young home ownership fell
over a period when it became easier to own a home. Our ¯ndings indicate
that a trend toward marrying later and the increase in household earnings risk
that occurred after 1980 account for 3/5 to 4/5 of the decline in young home
ownership.
Journal of Economic Literature Classi¯cation Numbers: E0; E2; J1; R21.
Keywords: Housing, home ownership, tenure choice, ¯rst-time home-buyers,
marriage, income risk
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Increasing home ownership has long been a high priority of policy makers. This strong
interest has led to a proliferation of legislated institutions and regulations intended
to make home ownership easier. Despite these e®orts, home ownership of households
with \heads" aged 25{44 years declined substantially between 1980 and 2000, even
as the aggregate home ownership rate was rising. Young ownership recovered only
partially during the 2001{2005 housing boom. The declines in young home ownership
after 1980 occurred as government intervention and private innovation in mortgage
markets should have made it easier to purchase a home. This paper seeks to under-
stand why home ownership of the young declined so much during this period when
owning should have become easier.
Our explanation is driven by changes in marriage and idiosyncratic earnings risk.
Below we document that marriage and home ownership are tightly linked. This fact
underlies why, for any given cohort and age, the married tend to own more than
the unmarried. Because of this tendency, a decline in the incidence of marriage
mechanically lowers home ownership. Between 1980 and 2000 marriage rates for
individuals aged 25{44 fell by 15 percentage points. But, this fall in marriage rates
does not account for all of the decline in young home ownership: combining the 2000
shares of unmarried and married with the corresponding 1980 home ownership rates
accounts for only half of the decline. Another indication that something else must be
going on is that home ownership has fallen for young, married households as well.1
The other main source of decline in young home ownership we point to is a rise
in household earnings risk. There is a large literature that documents increases in
individual and household earnings inequality and variability, but less research docu-
menting earnings uncertainty.2 Cunha and Heckman (2007) have examined earnings
uncertainty in two waves of the National Longitudinal Survey. They study white
males born between 1957 and 1964, surveyed starting in 1979, and an earlier sam-
ple born between 1941 and 1952, surveyed starting in 1966. They ¯nd for college
1We are not the ¯rst to notice the decline in home ownership of the young or the potential for
marriage to play a role in this decline. See, for example, Haurin et al. (1988) and Haurin et al.
(1996).
2See Katz and Autor (1999) for an early review of this literature and Dynan et al. (2007) for a
more recent review.
2graduates earnings risk increased 11% between the 1966 and the 1979 cohorts and
for high school graduates uncertainty rises by 52%. These ¯ndings suggest there
has been a substantial increase in earnings uncertainty in two cohorts important for
understanding the changes in home ownership between 1980 and 2000.
Higher earnings risk has two opposing e®ects on home ownership. Precautionary
savings increase with earnings risk, and this should ease the transition to home own-
ership. In our analysis we ¯nd this e®ect is dominated by the impact of risk on the
value of delaying home ownership. Other things being equal, an increase in earnings
risk reduces the incentive to own a home when there are proportional adjustment
costs. It is well-known that such costs exist for housing transactions. In the presence
of proportional transactions costs, the option of delaying the ¯rst home purchase un-
til the household is possibly wealthier, and can a®ord a larger house, has value. An
increase in household earnings risk increases the value of this option, thereby delaying
the transition to home ownership and lowering the home ownership rate.
There are other factors that a priori should have worked to raise young home
ownership between 1980 and 2000 and make the observed decline seem puzzling. We
have already emphasized the possible impact of mortgage innovations and government
intervention on home ownership. Another important factor is the greater participation
and improved outcomes of young females in the labor market after 1980. From 1980
to 1990 the employment rate of 25{44 year old females rose by close to 10 percentage
points. Concurrently, the male{female average wage premium was shrinking. So,
households with at least one female worker, other things unchanged, are richer, which
can increase home ownership. Like Caucutt et al. (2002), we suspect that these
changes in female labor market outcomes also drive the decline in marriage. However,
we do not account explicitly for this connection in our analysis.
We disentangle the e®ects of the competing factors driving young home ownership
with an equilibrium life-cycle model of consumption, saving, and housing. As in
Kiyotaki et al. (2007), home ownership is desired because the service °ow from renting
is discounted relative to owning the same house. For simplicity, our model has a
representative household. Marriage is modeled as the middle stage of a three stage
life-cycle and the link between marriage and home ownership is captured by allowing
the rental discount to be greater when married compared to the ¯rst stage of life.
3We account for less marriage by reducing the rate of transition to the middle stage of
life, since evidence we discuss below suggests delayed entry into marriage is the main
determinant of declining marriage rates. Higher household earnings risk is accounted
for by increasing the variance of the household's idiosyncratic earnings process.
We calibrate the model so that its stationary equilibrium is consistent with key
features of the U.S. economy in the years leading up to 1980. At the calibrated pa-
rameters, the model is consistent with microeconomic evidence that income, wealth,
and marriage are signi¯cant predictors of home ownership. We compare the 1980
calibration with the stationary equilibrium incorporating key structural changes af-
fecting home ownership in 2000, including delayed marriage, increased earnings risk,
improved female labor market outcomes, lower growth in the number of households,
and relaxed credit constraints. The e®ects of delayed marriage and increased earnings
risk are large enough to o®set the other structural changes, which boost home own-
ership, leading the model to account for between 3/5 and 4/5 of the decline in young
home ownership. We also ¯nd that easier access to mortgage credit has a relatively
small positive impact on home ownership.
Our paper contributes to two emerging literatures. Several papers, including
Blundell et al. (2008), Krueger and Perri (2006), and Heathcote et al. (2008), have
begun to investigate the aggregate implications of rising idiosyncratic earnings risk.
This work emphasizes the labor supply implications of rising income risk as well as
evidence that consumption inequality has risen by less than income inequality since
1980. This literature has yet to address how rising earnings risk is connected to trends
in home ownership.
The second literature studies housing choices within the context of equilibrium
life-cycle models. Gervais (2002) examines the preferential tax treatment of houses
on tenure choice. We abstract from this issue, but do discuss the possible role of taxes
in the decline in young home ownership. Chambers et al. (2009) study the rise in home
ownership after 1995 and, in contrast to our ¯ndings, argue that weaker borrowing
constraints played a big role. Kiyotaki et al. (2007) explore the global run-up in house
prices. In our model house prices are ¯xed, since houses are perfectly substitutable
with other goods. Still, similar to our analysis, they ¯nd relaxing mortgage constraints
has little e®ect on the demand for housing. Finally, D¶ ³az and Luengo-Prado (2006)
4examine the lifetime pattern of housing tenure. Consistent with our analysis, they
¯nd an important role for idiosyncratic earnings risk.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we document the trends in
home ownership and marriage as well as the connection between home ownership and
marriage. In section 3 we describe our life-cycle model, and in section 4 we describe
our calibration. Section 5 decomposes the decline in home ownership of the young
into the in°uence of the various factors we model. Section 6 considers other possible
explanations for the decline in young home ownership, including changes in house
prices, mobility, tax policy, and in°ation. Section 7 concludes.
2 Evidence on Home Ownership and Marriage
This section documents the decline in young home ownership and discusses the role
marriage seems to have played in this decline.
2.1 Trends in Home Ownership, 1960-2007
Figure 1 displays home ownership rates for the economy as a whole and households
with heads designated by the Census Bureau aged 25 to 44 years.3 These rates are
calculated using the Census of Population and Housing for the years 1960{2000, and
the American Community Survey for 2001{2007 (ACS). We use the Census Bureau
de¯nition of the home ownership rate for a household with particular characteristics
such as age: the number of households with those characteristics who own divided by
all households with those characteristics.
The overall home ownership rate grew by 3 percentage points between 1960 and
1980, dropped by about 1 percentage point between 1980 and 1990, and rose another
3 percentage points between 1990 and 2006, before dipping slightly in 2007. Key
factors driving the post-1990 rise in aggregate home ownership are higher ownership
rates for households over age 65 and an aging population. We discuss this further
3Before 1980 the husband was always classi¯ed as the head when he and his wife were living
together. In 1980 and after the head could be any household member in whose name the property
was owned or rented. If no such person was present, any adult could be selected.
5Figure 1: Home Ownership Rates, 1960-2007
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below. For the young the time path is quite di®erent. There is a large drop between
1980 and 1990, which takes the young home ownership rate two percentage points
below its 1960 level. Young ownership peaks two years earlier than the aggregate
rate and in 2007 is essentially back to its 2000 level. The trough in home ownership
in 1990 undoubtedly is driven in part by the large housing recession at the time, but
other factors must be in play as well because the young home ownership rate never
again attains its 1980 level.
For concreteness, we focus our analysis on the years 1980 and 2000. The year
1980 is the year of the highest young home ownership rates. We use the year 2000
for three reasons. First, by this time the structural changes we emphasize are ¯rmly
in place, including the developments that have made it easier to purchase a home.
Second, unlike 1990, cyclical factors should be playing a limited role at this time.
Third, the years after 2000 involve unique driving forces which are beyond the scope
of this paper.
The Census is not the only source for aggregate home ownership rates. It is in-
6Table 1: Changes in Home Ownership Rates by Age between 1980 and 2000
Source All Ages 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-64 65+
Census
1980 65.0 43.4 60.7 69.7 74.3 78.0 70.8
2000 66.2 36.0 53.0 63.4 69.1 76.8 77.5
Change 1.2 -7.4 -7.7 -6.3 -5.2 -1.2 6.7
CPS
1980 68.0 46.6 63.5 72.8 76.3 80.7 74.1
2000 67.2 37.1 54.6 63.6 70.4 77.9 80.5
Change -.8 -9.5 -8.9 -9.2 -5.9 -2.8 6.4
AHS
1980 66.5 44.2 62.3 72.3 75.1 79.1 72.9
1999 66.9 37.0 54.4 64.2 70.7 77.8 80.3
Change 0.4 -7.2 -5.9 -8.1 -4.6 -1.3 7.4
Note: Home ownership rates and their changes are reported in percent-
age points.
structive to consider two other sources as well: the Current Population Survey (CPS)
and the American (formerly Annual) Housing Survey (AHS). Table 1 displays changes
in home ownership rates, by age, between the years 1980 and 2000 for the Census
and CPS and between 1980 and 1999 for the AHS. Interestingly there are noticeable
di®erences in the levels of the home ownership rates across the three datasets, with
home ownership rates the highest in the CPS. However, the qualitative patterns are
quite similar, except that the CPS indicates a slight decline in the overall home own-
ership rate, while the other two data sources show a small increase. Most importantly,
regardless of the source of the evidence, the changes for the young age groups 25-29,
30-34, 35-39, and 40-44 are all large and negative. We conclude that, regardless of
the source of the data, the evidence strongly suggests there has been a substantial
decline in home ownership among the young between 1980 and 2000. For simplicity,
we base our analysis on the Census.4
4We are more con¯dent in the Census home ownership numbers because home ownership is a
primary measurement target for this data source. The Census Bureau appears to place more weight
on the Census when it uses it to re-calibrate the CPS periodically. The CPS uses weights designed
7Table 2: Young Home Ownership by Household Characteristic
Characteristic 1980 2000 Di®erence
Head's Race
White 64.1 63.4 -0.7
Black 38.2 36.6 -1.6
Other 48.2 41.4 -6.8
Head's Sex
Male 67.2 63.9 -3.3
Female 36.0 43.1 7.1
Head's Marital Status
Not Married 33.0 38.2 5.2
Married 74.0 71.9 -2.1
Children in Household
None 41.4 45.1 3.8
One 63.3 60.4 -3.0
Two or more 72.5 67.0 -5.5
Adults in Household
One 30.9 36.2 5.3
Two 69.6 66.4 -3.2
Three or more 71.7 61.2 -10.5
Region
East 54.4 53.5 -0.9
Midwest 66.4 63.8 -2.6
South 62.4 59.1 -3.3
West 56.0 50.5 -5.5
Head's Education
< High School 49.8 40.2 -9.5
High School or Some College 62.1 57.4 -4.5
College 64.8 62.7 -2.1
Head's Income Quintile
1 29.9 27.6 -2.3
2 45.2 43.0 -2.2
3 64.3 59.1 -5.2
4 77.7 73.5 -4.2
5 86.4 83.9 -2.5
Source: Census of Population and Housing, 1980 and 2000.
8All three datasets indicate the home ownership rate for the 45-64 age group de-
clined by a small amount, while the rate for the over 65 age group rose by a large
amount. The structural changes we have in mind should have smaller e®ects on these
two age groups. We think their home ownership rates are primarily in°uenced by
decisions made younger in life. This last point is easiest to see with the over 65s. The
2000 over 65 age group corresponds to the 45-64 age group in 1980, and, consistent
with older home ownership being driven by decisions made when younger, their home
ownership rates are very close. This deterministic feature of home ownership for older
households is the reason we do not focus on them in our analysis.
Table 2 demonstrates that the decline in young home ownership between 1980 and
2000 is broad-based. It breaks out the decline in ownership of young households by
di®erent household characteristics. For all distinguishing characteristics but four, the
home ownership rate has fallen between 1980 and 2000. These include, race, number
of children, number of adults, region, educational attainment, and income quintile.
The increases are concentrated among single females living alone. We suspect these
increases are mainly due to the wealth e®ect discussed in the introduction.
2.2 Trends in the Mortgages of First-Time Home Buyers
The decline in home ownership among the young is striking because it came during
a time when mortgage opportunities for young families seem to have expanded dra-
matically. Many papers document the development of the mortgage market and the
regulatory changes since the early 1980s.5 Public and private initiatives expanded
mortgage opportunities by lowering transactions costs, the underlying real interest
rate, and the required down-payment, among other factors. We now brie°y doc-
ument how mortgage criteria for the young became less stringent after the 1970s,
concurrent with the changes to mortgage markets.
Table 3 describes borrowing characteristics of ¯rst-time home buyers over the
to improve the precision of its labor market variables, not home ownership rates. Similarly, the AHS
is designed to measure home sales, not home ownership rates.
5Florida (1986) contains several essays describing mortgage market deregulation. Gerardi et al.
(2007) provide a recent overview of how the mortgage market has evolved. Edelberg (2003) discusses
the expanded use of sophisticated credit scoring methods in the mid-1990s. Ryding (1990) and
Van Order (2000) describe the evolution of the secondary mortgage market.
9Table 3: Characteristics of First-Time House Buyers
Statistic 1976-80 1981-90 1991-99
Median Price/Median Income 2.0 2.1 2.4
Mean Down-payment/Price .18 .16 .14
Mean Monthly Payment/After-Tax Income .29 .34 .35
Source: Various issues of The Guarantor, 1978-1999.
period 1976{1999. The mortgage market changes should have their largest impact
on ¯rst-time home buyers, because they are more likely to have lower income and
wealth and greater credit constraints than other buyers. Also, ¯rst-time home buyers
are typically within the young age groups we focus on. Table 3 indicates that ¯rst-
time buyers ¯nanced their house purchases with progressively larger value to income
ratios, lower down-payments, and higher monthly payments. In the 1976-80 period
the median house price averages 2.0 times median income, in the 1981-90 period the
multiple is 2.1, and over the period 1991-99 the multiple is 2.4. These houses are
purchased with an average down-payment of just 14 percent of the house value over
the period 1991-99, compared to 16 percent in 1981-90 and 18 percent in 1976-80.
To acquire the higher value houses relative to income, ¯rst-time buyers increase the
share of income they devote to mortgage servicing, rising from .29 in 1976-80 to .35
in 1991-99. Overall, Table 3 strongly suggests mortgage criteria for ¯rst-time home
buyers became less stringent after the 1970s.
2.3 Marriage and Home Buying
To understand the changes in young home ownership, we need to assess what drives
the house purchase decision of the young. To start our analysis we use the National
Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) for the 1979 cohort of about 13,000 individuals
14-22 years of age. This is a dataset of individuals that also has information on family
level variables. The sample years are 1985-1994, 1996, and 1998.6 Since we have
relatively few observations for individuals aged 40 and over, we restrict the sample
to those aged 21{39. We use the NLSY because it has many more years of net worth
6Wealth data are not available prior to 1985.
10Table 4: Linear Probability Model of Young Home ownership
Coe±cient Standard Error
Real net assets (000s) .006 .0002
Real household income (000s) .003 .0001
Married (versus not married) .23 .005
Female (versus male) .01 .003
Race is White (versus not white) .02 .004
Education is more (versus less) than college -.03 .01
Age (versus under 25)
25-29 .04 .004
30-34 .09 .01
35-39 .14 .01
Adults in household (versus single)
2 .013 .004
> 3 -.09 .004
Children in household (versus none)
1 .05 .005
2 .08 .005
> 2 .04 .01
Number of Observations 52,233
R2 .34
Source: Our estimates using the NLSY.
data over our sample compared to other datasets, and wealth is an important factor
for home ownership.
We begin by estimating a linear probability model of young home ownership using
the variables in Table 4 plus year e®ects as regressors. Assets and income are de°ated
by the CPI.7 The table displays coe±cient estimates with robust standard errors.
7Net assets and income include those for the survey respondent and their spouse, if the spouse
lives with the respondent. Income is labor plus transfer income. As in Zagorsky (1999), net assets
are de¯ned as the sum of home value, cash, stockholdings, trust holdings, business equity, car value,
IRA holdings, certi¯cates of deposit, 401(k) holdings, and non-car durables goods, less the sum of
mortgage and other property debt, car debt, and any other debt. Top coding a®ects about 10 percent
of the sample in the later years of the survey. Since individual items of net assets are top-coded, we
drop observations with any top-coding. We use the weights provided by the NLYS in our estimation
to correct for the oversampling of the poor and members of the military.
11Figure 2: Marriage Near Home Purchases
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
.
4
.
5
P
r
o
b
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
−4 −2 0 2 4
Years from purchase
First Second
A. First and Second Purchase
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
.
4
.
5
P
r
o
b
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
−4 −2 0 2 4
Years from purchase
1968−1986 1979−1997
B. 1968 and 1979 Cohorts
Note: These are our estimates from the PSID. The coe±cients
corresponding to -4 to 4 years after the ¯rst or second purchase
are plotted with 95% con¯dence intervals.
The coe±cients on the categorical variables are interpreted as marginal e®ects on
probability relative to the indicated omitted category. The coe±cients on real wealth
and assets are interpreted as the e®ect of an extra $1,000 on the probability of owning.
Every variable is highly signi¯cant. Marriage stands out as having a particularly large
e®ect. The coe±cient on marriage says that in our sample if you are married, then
you are 23% more likely to own compared to someone of the same assets, income,
sex, race, education, age, family structure, and year who is not married.
The regression results suggest that studying the dynamics of marriage around the
¯rst home purchase could be illuminating. Figure 2 plots conditional probabilities
of being married in the years surrounding a ¯rst or second home purchase estimated
using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). We want to measure the extent
to which marriage is associated with home purchase decisions. We do so by regressing
a dummy variable for whether the respondent is married on a set of dummy variables
for the years before, during, and after the ¯rst or second purchase, plus dummies for
12year, age, household size, educational attainment, and sex. The ¯gure plots the ¯tted
values and 95% con¯dence intervals for the year relative to year of home purchase.
The omitted category in both cases is individuals who are never observed to own and
for which we have at least ¯fteen years of data on whether they own or rent.
Figure 2's Panel A reveals that marriage is more closely associated with the ¯rst
home purchase than the second one. In the ¯rst purchase case, respondents are
approximately 35 percent more likely to be married compared to respondents with
the same characteristics that never buy a house. There is a big jump upward in the
likelihood of being married in the year of the ¯rst purchase. After the purchase there
is little change in the likelihood of being married. The qualitative pattern of marriage
around the second purchase is similar but much more muted. The peak is about the
same, but there is not the jump at zero which occurs in the ¯rst purchase case. We
draw two conclusions from this plot. First, marriage and home purchases occur at
similar times. Second, marriage and the ¯rst purchase are the most tightly linked.
Figure 2's panel B shows that there has been little change over time in the dy-
namics of marriage and the ¯rst home purchase. Most importantly, the jump near
marriage is about the same. Although there is a tight connection between marriage
and the ¯rst home purchase for both cohorts, the trend toward later marriages has
weakened the relationship somewhat. Note that this reduction is in addition to the
secular decline in marriage rates by age, which is accounted for in our regression
model by the year dummies. Since individuals purchase homes for reasons other than
family formation, we expect the association between marriage and the ¯rst purchase
to decline if individuals marry later.
2.4 Delayed Marriage and Trends in Home Ownership
Taken together, the regression results strongly suggest that any trends in marriage
will be important for understanding the decline in young home ownership. So, now
we consider trends in marriage and their impact on young home ownership using the
Census of Population and Housing.
The key trend in marriage is that young people are much less likely to be married
at any given age today than they were in 1980. This is demonstrated in Figure 3.
13Figure 3: Marriage Rates in 1980 and 2000
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For males, in 1980 there was roughly a 50% chance that you were married at age
25. By 2000 you would have to be 30 years old to have the same chance. Females
behave similarly, but not identically, since the age distribution of marriage matches
is di®erent for males and females.
The marriage rate re°ects two e®ects: entry into and exit from the state of mar-
riage. Stevenson and Wolfers (2007) describe evidence indicating increased exit is
not the key factor underlying declining marriage rates since 1980, so we focus on
entry into the state of marriage. The primary determinant of entry into marriage is
the timing of the ¯rst marriage. As we just documented, the ¯rst home purchase is
tightly connected to the ¯rst marriage. So, delayed entry into the state of marriage
for the ¯rst time should delay the transition to home ownership as well.
Figure 4 demonstrates that the ¯rst marriage is substantially delayed in 2000
compared to 1980 for both males and females. It displays the fraction of males and
females of a given age who have never been married. The upward shift in the pro¯le of
14Figure 4: Never Married Rates in 1980 and 2000
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\Never married" rates in 2000 compared to 1980 indicates that individuals are much
less likely to have ever married in 2000 compared to 1980. The magnitude of the shift
is similar to that for marriage rates shown in Figure 3. This points toward delayed
marriage being the primary proximate cause of the decline in marriage among the
young.
Figure 5 con¯rms that delayed marriage must lower home ownership rates. This
¯gure displays home ownership rates by marital status in 1980 and 2000. There was
a small increase in home ownership between 1980 and 2000 for unmarried household
heads. This presumably re°ects our discussion of Table 2 that home ownership has
increased among single females. Since the home ownership rate of married household
heads is always higher than for the unmarried at a particular age, it follows that
the decline in the marriage rate mechanically leads to a decline in home ownership.
However, the fact that the home ownership rate of the married falls between 1980 and
2000 implies that something else must be involved. This motivates our consideration
15Figure 5: Home ownership Rates in 1980 and 2000
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of the role of heightened earnings risk.
3 The Model Economy
In this section we describe our life-cycle model of tenure choice with idiosyncratic earn-
ings risk. The model consists of representative households, goods producing ¯rms,
and ¯nancial intermediaries. For parsimony, we do not model marriage explicitly.
Households experience a three stage life-cycle, where the second stage of life is inter-
preted as marriage. They derive utility from consumption and housing services, are
subject to an exogenous, stochastic °ow of labor income, and via intermediaries invest
in non-residential and housing capital. We assume that rental housing yields services
at a discount relative to owned housing. However, while changing rental housing is
costless, owning requires a down-payment, and buying and selling an owner-occupied
house involves transactions costs. We now describe the model in detail.
163.1 The Representative Household
Preferences The economy has a large number of ex-ante identical households who
forever repeat the same three-stage life-cycle of being young, having a family, and
retirement. The transitions between the stages of life occur with ¯xed and known
probabilities. Households care about their future selves as much as they care about
their current self and so preferences are represented by
Ut = Et
1 X
j=t
¯
j¡tu(cj;Ãjhj); 0 < ¯ < 1: (1)
For the incarnation of the household alive in period j, cj denotes the quantity of
goods consumed and hj is the quantity of housing the household occupies and either
rents or owns. The variable Ãj determines how much the household prefers to own
rather than rent. When the household rents its home Ãj < 1 and when the household
owns its home Ãj = 1. The parameter ¯ is the household's time discount factor. We
assume a time period equals one year. For simplicity, below we drop time subscripts.
With a couple of exceptions, the prime symbol denotes the current value of a choice
variable and the absence of this symbol indicates the previous period's value of the
same variable.
Stages of the Life-Cycle The state variable s controls both the life-cycle status
and labor earnings of a household. Let s 2 S = Y [ F [ R = f1;2;:::;Ng [
fN + 1;N + 2;:::;2Ng [ f2N + 1;2N + 2;:::;3Ng. Households go through three
stages of life. When s 2 Y, a household is a young type whose housing services
when renting are discounted by Ã(s;0) = Ãy < 1. When s 2 F, a household is a
family type. For this household type rented housing services are discounted at the
rate Ã(s;0) = Ãf. We have in mind that Ãf < Ãy, to capture the tight connection
between marriage and home ownership we have documented. This would also be
consistent with the empirical phenomenon that many housing services desired by
families, such as proximity to good schools and parks, are harder to obtain in rental
housing. However in our calibration we do not impose this condition. Finally, when
a household's state transits to s 2 R, the household retires and the rental discount
reverts to Ã(s;0) = Ãy.
17Non-retired households supply one unit of labor inelastically and face uninsurable
idiosyncratic uncertainty with respect to their labor productivity. A household in
state s 2 Y [ F is endowed with e(s) e±ciency units of labor, each unit being
paid after-tax wage rate w = (1 ¡ ¿w)^ w, where ¿w is a labor income tax and ^ w
is the before-tax wage rate. The revenues from the labor income tax are used to
operate a pay-as-you-go social security system. All retired households are entitled to
a social security payment equal to a fraction, µ, of average before-tax earnings of the
working population. To keep the notation consistent with working households, we let
e(s) = µe=(1¡¿w) if s 2 R, where e is the average labor productivity of the working-
age population. Given the simple structure of this social security system, it can easily
be shown that ¿w = µ¹R=(1¡¹R), where ¹R is the fraction of the population that is
retired.
The process governing a household's state over time is described by the Markov
matrix ¦,
¦ =
2
6
4
¦YY ¦YF 0N
0N ¦FF ¦FR
G¦RY 0N ¦RR
3
7
5;
where 0N denotes an N £N matrix of zeros and the other terms are non-zero N £N
matrices. We use ¼ss0 to denote individual elements of ¦. Since households need to
go through an entire life-cycle, the probability of going from set Y to set R is zero.
Similarly, the probabilities of transiting from set F to set Y and set R to set F are
also zero. The elements of matrix ¦YY and those of matrix ¦FF control how e±ciency
units supplied by young and family households evolve over time. The matrices ¦FR
and ¦RR are diagonal. The matrix ¦RY controls the probability of dying and the
magnitude of intergenerational earnings persistence. At the same time as death, a
new generation of households of size G are born, where G > 1 determines the rate at
which the number of households grows.
Labor e±ciency of the newborn is controlled by the elements of the matrix ¦RY
as follows:
¦RY =
2
6
6
4
µ1± ¢¢¢ µN±
. . .
µ1± ¢¢¢ µN±
3
7
7
5;
where ± is the probability of dying, and [µ1;:::;µN] is the part of the invariant distri-
18bution ¦ associated with the young stage of life. As written, the matrix ¦RY assumes
that there is no intergenerational earnings persistence because each household has the
same probability of being any of the N types of young households, regardless of the
parent's type at the time of death.
Housing We use the housing tenure variable x0 to indicate whether the household
rents or owns in the current period, and if it owns, the quantity of housing services
consumed. Households that currently own and occupy a house of size hi have x0 = i
and households who currently rent have x0 = 0.
Owned houses must be chosen from a ¯nite grid,
G = fhi;i = 1;2;:::;M : hi 2 [h;¹ h]g:
Households that rent may choose a continuous quantity of housing for houses smaller
than h, but are con¯ned to the set G for larger houses. The parameter h is impor-
tant for reconciling home ownership rates with the quantity of owned housing in the
economy. We summarize the set of possible house choices in the current period as
follows:
h
0 2 H(x
0); (2)
where
H(x
0) =
(
(0;h) [ G; if x0 = 0;
G; if x0 > 0;
and
x
0 2 X = f0;1;2;:::;Mg: (3)
All houses depreciate at the rate ±h 2 [0;1]: To accommodate the housing grid, we
assume that each house requires maintenance equal to depreciation each period in
order to be habitable.
In addition to assuming that there is a minimum sized house that can be owned, h,
we also assume that owning a house involves two kinds of costs. First, we assume that
to own a house the household must have an exogenously determined minimum equity
stake in the house the ¯rst year the house is occupied, i.e. it faces a down-payment
constraint. After the ¯rst year, and as long as the household does not change the
size of its house, the down-payment constraint does not apply. Second, if a household
19changes the size of its owned and occupied house, it faces costs of buying and selling
that are proportional to the size of the house involved, ¿b and ¿s. Transactions costs
are given by
¿(x;x
0) =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
¿bhx0; if x = 0 and x0 > 0;
¿bhx0 + ¿shx; if x > 0, x0 > 0 and x 6= x0;
¿shx if x > 0 and x0 = 0;
0; otherwise:
Saving Households accumulate wealth with two types of assets: owner-occupied
houses and a generic asset called deposits, d, which pay interest i. We assume the
interest is paid during the current period and the deposit is returned at the beginning
of the next period. Let a denote the household's net worth at the beginning of the
period. All households face a non-negative savings restriction, a0 ¸ 0. In addition,
homeowners may borrow against their house by acquiring a mortgage at the interest
rate i. Consistent with deposits, the interest is paid during the current period and
the principal is paid at the beginning of the following period. Because households
borrow and lend at the same interest rate, they are indi®erent between paying down
their mortgage and accumulating ¯nancial assets. We assume that households pay
down their mortgage before accumulating any ¯nancial assets.
The down-payment constraint says that a mortgage acquired in the current period,
m0, is limited to be no more than a fraction °d of the value of the home so that
m0 · (1¡°d)h0. Current savings of a household that chooses to be a homeowner next
period are a0 = d0+h0¡m0. It follows that in the year the mortgage is acquired, savings
must be at least as big as the minimum down-payment on the house: a0 ¸ °dh0. We
summarize the constraint on savings as follows
a
0 ¸ °(x;x
0); (4)
where
°(x;x
0) =
(
0; if x0 = 0 or x0 > 0 and x = x0;
°dhx0; if x0 > 0 and x 6= x0 :
Recursive Formulation of the Household's Problem The problem faced by
the representative household is to choose sequences of consumption, asset holdings,
20housing tenure, and housing services to maximize (1), subject to (2){(4), c > 0, and
the budget constraint
c + phh
0 + a
0 + ¿(x;x
0) = we(s) + a + ia
0; (5)
where ph is the price of housing services determined by a no-arbitrage condition
described below.
To address how to allocate assets of retired households who die between periods,
we introduce annuities. We assume households face a 100% estate tax upon death
so they would never bequeath any wealth to their children. To avoid accidental
bequests, households participate in annuity markets. All retired households (the only
households that have a positive probability of dying) pool their net worth together in
the current period and divide that pool among the survivors in the following period
according to their proportion of the pooled net worth. Since each unit of net worth
has the same probability of surviving, 1 ¡ ±, each retired household ends up with
1=(1 ¡ ±) of their net worth tomorrow should they survive.
Let V (s;x;a) denote the value function of a household that enters a period with
state variables s, x and a. The recursive representation of the household's problem is
as follows:
V (s;x;a) = max (c>0;x02X;
a0¸°(x;x0);
h02H(x0)
)
(
U(c;Ã(s;x
0)h
0) + ¯
X
s02S
¼ss0V (s
0;x
0;'(s)a
0)
)
(6)
subject to (5), where '(s) = 1 unless the household is retired in the current period,
in which case it equals 1=(1 ¡ ±).
3.2 Producers
Firms maximize pro¯ts
f(k;l) ¡ wl ¡ pkk;
where f(k;l) is a constant returns production function, k denotes non-residential
capital used in production, l denotes the quantity of labor employed, measured in
e±ciency units, and pk denotes the rental price of non-residential capital. We as-
sume that producers' output can be costlessly transformed into consumption goods,
21new residential capital or new non-residential capital. Consequently, the prices of
these goods are all equal to one in a competitive equilibrium. Non-residential capital
depreciates at the rate ±k 2 [0;1].
3.3 Financial Intermediaries
Non-residential investment and investment in rental housing is undertaken by over-
lapping generations of two-period-lived risk-neutral ¯nancial intermediaries. In their
¯rst period, intermediaries accept deposits from households, Df, which they use to
purchase from the previous generation of intermediaries non-residential capital, Kf,
and rental housing capital, Hf, and to issue mortgages to homeowners, Mf. During
the period the newly purchased non-residential capital is rented to producers and
the housing is rented to households.8 Interest on deposits is paid at the end of the
¯rst period. At the beginning of the second period, the capital is sold to the new
generation of intermediaries, the mortgage principal is repaid, and the deposits are
returned to households. The problem of a ¯nancial intermediary is:
max
fKf;Hf;Mf;Dfg
(pk ¡ ±k)Kf + (ph ¡ ±h)Hf + iMf ¡ iDf (7)
subject to the constraint
Kf + Hf + Mf · Df: (8)
The solution to this maximization problem yields the following no-arbitrage condi-
tions:
pk = i + ±k;
ph = i + ±h:
(9)
It follows that ¯nancial intermediaries are indi®erent at the margin between their
asset holdings, and liabilities and they make zero pro¯ts in equilibrium.
8We assume that new capital is productive immediately, i.e. there is no time-to-build. This
assumption is made to treat non-residential capital symmetrically with housing. Since the time
period in the model is one year we think this is a reasonable assumption.
223.4 Stationary Competitive Equilibrium
A stationary competitive equilibrium consists of a value function V (s;x;a), decision
rules for savings ga(s;x;a), tenure choice gx(s;x;a) and housing services gh(s;x;a),
prices fi;w;ph;pkg, a ¯scal policy f¿;µg, aggregate quantities fK0;H0;Lg, an allo-
cation for ¯nancial intermediaries fDf;Kf;Hf;Mfg, and a measure ¸(s;x;a) such
that
1. Given prices and the ¯scal policy, the value function and associated policy rules
solve the household problem as given by (5) and (6);
2. Given prices and the ¯scal policy, producers maximize pro¯ts. This implies
factors are paid their marginal products: pk = f1(K0;L), ^ w = f2(K0;L), where
L is the aggregate demand for labor by producers;
3. Given prices and the ¯scal policy, fDf;Kf;Hf;Mfg solves the ¯nancial inter-
mediaries' problem given by (7) and (8). This implies (8) holds with equality
and the no-arbitrage conditions (9) hold;
4. Aggregates are consistent with individual behavior: ¸(s;x;a) is generated by
¸(s
0;x
0;a
0) =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
0; if s 2 R, s0 2 Y, a0 > 0
P
s2Y ¼ss0
PM
x=0
R
a2A(a0;x0) ¸(s;x;da)
+
P
s2R ¼ss0
PM
x=0
R
a¸0 ¸(s;x;da); if s0 2 Y;x0 = a0 = 0
P
s2S ¼ss0
PM
x=0
R
a2A(a0;x0) ¸(s;x;da); otherwise
where
A(a
0;x
0) = f(a;x) : ga(s;x;a) · a
0; gx(s;x;a) = x
0g;
5. The social security system is self-¯nanced: ¿w = µ¹R=(1 ¡ ¹R);
236. Markets clear:
Df =
X
s2S
M X
x=0
Z
a¸0
ga¸(s;x;da) ¡
X
s2S
M X
x=1
Z
a¸0
gh¸(s;x;da)
+
X
s2S
M X
x=0
Z
fa:gh>ga and gx>0g
[gh ¡ ga]¸(s;x;da);
H
0 =
X
s2S
M X
x=0
Z
a¸0
gh¸(s;x;da);
Hf =
X
s2S
Z
a¸0
gh(s;0;a)¸(s;0;da);
Mf =
X
s2S
M X
x=0
Z
fa:gh>ga and gx>0g
[gh ¡ ga]¸(s;x;da);
Kf = K
0;
L =
2N X
s=1
µse(s);
where we have suppressed the arguments of the decision rules when there is
no ambiguity about what they are. These expressions are the clearing condi-
tions for the deposit market, the aggregate housing market, the rental housing
market, the mortgage market, the non-residential capital market, and the labor
market. These conditions should be transparent except for the deposit market
condition. This condition says all households' net worth minus total equity in
owner occupied housing must equal deposits at ¯nancial intermediaries. If all
these conditions are satis¯ed, then the goods market must clear by Walras' law.
4 Calibration
We use stationary equilibria of our model to quantify the role of structural change on
young home ownership. Our baseline scenario is designed to capture the environment
faced by households in the years leading up to 1980. We compare this baseline
to one that embodies the structural changes which occurred after 1980 and are a
feature of the environment faced by households in the years leading up to 2000. This
section describes how we assign values to the model's parameters in the 1980 and
242000 calibrations. At the end of this section we brie°y discuss household behavior in
the model at the calibrated parameter values.
4.1 1980 Calibration
We assume the functional form of the utility function is
u(c;Ã(s;x)h) = ln(c) +
(Ã(s;x)h)
1¡¾ ¡ 1
1 ¡ ¾
; ¾ ¸ 0:
and the functional form of the production function is
f(k;l) = Ak
®l
1¡®:
We set the number of income states in each of the two working stages of life to N = 9
and the number of houses to M = 20. Our results are not sensitive to increasing the
number of houses. The upper limits on house size and assets, ¹ h and ¹ a, are also chosen
so that increasing their magnitudes does not a®ect our results.
The parameters we need to calibrate include those governing the income process,
f¦;e;µ;¿;Gg, preferences, f¯;´;¾;Ãy;Ãfg, production, fA;®;±h;±kg, and housing
fh;¿b;¿s °dg. Our calibration strategy is to ¯rst use direct evidence to assign values
to the income process and some housing and preference parameters, and then to
choose the remaining parameters to bring the model as close as possible to a short
list of statistics. Table 5 displays parameter values which are held ¯xed across the
1980 and 2000 calibrations. Table 6 later in this section displays parameters which
change between the two calibrations to account for various structural changes.
The income process involves three key inputs into our analysis: the speed of
transition to \marriage", di®erences in income over the life-cycle, and idiosyncratic
risk. We assume that within each of the ¯rst two life stages, income follows a Tauchen
and Hussey (1991) approximation to a ¯rst-order auto-regressive process. It follows
that the income process is completely speci¯ed by the following elements: the average
duration of each life stage, the mean, innovation variance, and serial correlation of
income in the young and family stages of life, the replacement ratio for the retired
life stage, and the growth rate for the number of households. We now describe how
we calibrate these characteristics.
25Table 5: Parameters Constant Across the 1980 and 2000 Calibrations
Preferences
¯ 0:951 ¾ 2:0 ´ 0:879
Ãy 0:9544 Ãf 0:87
Housing
¿b 0:0163 ¿s 0:0776 h 1:15
Production
® 0:257 ±k 0:082 ±h 0:044
Social Security
µ 0:06 ¿ 0:061
Income Process
Expected age at transition to retirement: 65
Expected lifetime: 75
Income ratio of family versus young: 1.47
Autocorrelation of income: .95
We interpret the transition from the young to family type as the event of marriage.
The duration of the ¯rst stage of life is selected so that the fraction of individuals
who do not marry, that is transit to the second stage of life, by age 27, corresponds
to the estimate for the cohort born in the period 1948{1957 reported in Table IV of
Caucutt et al. (2002). Life is assumed to begin at age 18 and we assume the average
durations for the three stages are 6, 39, and 9 years. On average, the young stage of
life is 18-24, the family stage is 25-64, and the retirement stage is 65-74.
Household income jumps signi¯cantly around the time of marriage. To capture
this phenomenon we assume that average income of the family type is higher than
for the young type. We calibrate this increase in income by estimating the average
amount by which family income rises upon ¯rst marriage using data from the NLSY.9
We normalize average income over the young and family stages of life to one and use
9Speci¯cally, we regress percent changes in income on dummy variables for year, age, education,
household size, sex, and a dummy variable indicating the years before, during, and after the year of
¯rst marriage. The estimate for our calibration is the coe±cient on the dummy variable for year of
¯rst marriage. The income variable includes earnings income of the individual and, when relevant,
their spouse. We get similar results using the PSID.
26our estimate of the marriage income increase, 47%, to determine average income in
the two stages of life.
The third key feature of the income process is risk. Income risk is governed
by the autocorrelation coe±cient and innovation variance for the young and family
stages of life. We use the life-cycle income process estimated from the PSID from
1968 to 2004 by Storesletten et al. (2004) to guide our selection of these parameters.
Storesletten et al. (2004) assume the autocorrelation of income does not change over
the working years of the life-cycle. Accordingly, we ¯x the autocorrelation for the
two working life-cycle stages at a value, .95, which is within the range of estimates
reported in Table 2 of Storesletten et al. (2004). Given the evidence discussed below
that idiosyncratic risk has risen between 1980 and 2000, we cannot directly use the
variance estimates in Storesletten et al. (2004). Instead, we assume the life-cycle
conditional variances they report are an equally weighted sum of variances from the
two halves of their sample, corresponding to our 1980 and 2000 calibrations. Using
an assumption, discussed below, of how much the conditional variances increase, we
calculate conditional variances for both sub-samples. We take the average variance of
earnings for the under 25 and the 26-55 age groups, .3 and .5, to calculate the young
and family cross-sectional variances. Once we have the cross-sectional variances, we
calculate the innovation variances using our assumed autocorrelation coe±cient.
To complete the speci¯cation of income, we need to assign values to the social secu-
rity replacement ratio, the labor tax, and the rate at which the number of households
grows. The replacement ratio for retirees is µ = 0:4, which is taken from Mitchell and
Phillips (2006). We set the labor tax, ¿w; to be the value which ¯nances the social
security system. Since labor is supplied inelastically, the labor tax is really just a
lump sum tax and so does not a®ect any decisions at the margin. The growth factor,
G, is set to 2.35, corresponding to a growth rate of 2 percent, which is the mean
growth rate of households from 1960 to 1980 as reported by the Census Bureau.
Housing transactions costs are very important for our analysis since they deter-
mine the magnitude of the e®ect of income risk on the option value of delaying a
housing transaction. There are several kinds of housing transactions costs, often
called \closing costs," including real estate agent fees, fees and taxes associated with
recording an o±cial record of the transaction, attorney fees, real estate transfer taxes,
27title search, and title insurance. Some of these costs vary widely by jurisdiction and
the magnitude and complexity of the transaction. In addition, while the convention
for real estate agents' fees is 6% of the property value, agents are sometimes willing
to reduce their rate to close a deal. We obtain our estimates of average transactions
costs from globalpropertyguide.com. This is a ¯rm specializing in selling informa-
tion relevant to real estate investors. They estimate U.S. housing transactions costs
as a percentage of property values to be in the range 1.05% { 2.2% for buyers and
6.51% { 9% for sellers. These costs include those mentioned above, but exclude other
costs such as appraisal fees, home insurance, mortgage and bank-related fees, and
inspection fees. We use the mid-point of the ranges: ¿b = :0163 and ¿s = :0776.
The down-payment parameter, °d, is set to .2 in the 1980 calibration. This value is
commonly used in the literature because of its important role empirically. Speci¯cally,
a down-payment of at least 20% is required to avoid paying mortgage insurance.
The remaining parameters are ¯; ´; ¾; Ãy; Ãf; A; ®; ±h; ±k; and h: The discount rate
¯ is chosen so that the interest rate is 5% and A is normalized to 1. The parameters
®; ±h; and ±k are chosen to match empirical estimates of the nonresidential plus
residential investment to output ratio (.26), non-residential capital to output ratio
(1.95), and the residential capital to output ratio (.97). The parameters ´; Ãy; Ãf;
and h are chosen to match the share of owned residential capital in total residential
capital (.7), the share of housing services in total consumption (.11), the overall home
ownership rate of the 25{44 age group (60.6%), and the home ownership rate of the
never married among the 25{44 age group (25.1%).10 Table 5 indicates that the
calibrated value of Ãf is smaller than that for Ãy, consistent with the link between
marriage and home ownership we have documented. Finally, ¾ is chosen, within a
range consistent with estimated income elasticities of housing demand, to match the
life-cycle pro¯le of home ownership. By this latter criterion we mean the increase in
home ownership from the 25{29 age group to the 40{44 age group of all households
10The home ownership rates are estimated from the Census of Population and Housing and the
remaining statistics are estimated using NIPA data (described in the appendix) for the period 1955{
1980. In practice, we do not exactly match the home ownership rate targets. Our target for the share
of consumption spending that is on housing services is small compared to that used by some other
authors, for example Davis and Ortalo-Magn¶ e (2007). Their share is based on including household
operation in housing services and computing it only for renters. Our measure of housing services
excludes expenditures on household operations.
28Table 6: Parameters Governing Di®erences in the 1980 and 2000 Calibrations
1980 2000
Minimum down-payment requirement (°d) 0.200 0.133
Expected age at transition to family stage 25 27
Variance of innovations during young stage 0.025 0.033
Variance of innovations during family stage 0.042 0.056
Productivity e®ect (A) 1.000 1.041
Population growth (G) 0.020 0.013
and never married households. We found ¾ = 2 to do the best along these two
dimensions. The implied income elasticity of housing demand in the model is :33;
which is toward the low end of estimates in the literature, e.g. Hansen et al. (1998).
4.2 2000 Calibration
The 2000 calibration embodies several structural changes that should have in°uenced
young home ownership between 1980 and 2000. These include a lower down-payment
constraint, delayed marriage, slower growth in the number of households, heightened
idiosyncratic income risk, and greater aggregate productivity due to the changes in
female labor market outcomes. Recall that Table 6 displays the model parameters
which change across the two calibrations.
The down-payment constraint is set to .13, which is 2/3 of the value used in the
1980 calibration. The 2/3 value roughly corresponds to the ratio of the average down-
payment in the 1990s compared to the 1970s. To approximate the phenomenon of
delayed marriage after 1980, we assume that the average duration of the young family
stage is 2 years longer in the 2000 calibration. This implies the same value for the
fraction of individuals who do not marry by age 27 for the cohort born in the period
1958{1967 reported in Table IV of Caucutt et al. (2002), 34%. We set G = 1:83 to
match the rate of growth in the number of households over the period 1980-2000,
1.3%.
The percentage increase in idiosyncratic risk we assume for the later sample is
29based on the ¯ndings in Cunha and Heckman (2007) discussed in the introduction.
Recall that this paper studies white males born between 1957 and 1964, surveyed
starting in 1979, and an earlier sample born between 1941 and 1952, surveyed starting
in 1966. Between the two samples, earnings uncertainty, de¯ned as the variance of
the unforecastable component of earnings, rises by 11% for college graduates and
52% for high school graduates. They also ¯nd uncertainty in the rate of return to
schooling rises by 33%. Using the 1980 and 2000 Census we ¯nd the percentage of
individuals aged 25-44 who were high school graduates rose from 59% to 61%. The
college graduate share rose from 22% to 27%. These changes plus the ¯ndings in
Cunha and Heckman (2007) translate to an increase in overall earnings uncertainty
of 39%. We use the average of the increases in uncertainty in earnings and in returns
to schooling, 36%, as the amount by which earnings risk rises in our 2000 calibration
compared to our 1980 calibration.
Two developments in the labor market experience of women likely a®ected young
home ownership. First, the gender wage premium has declined. For example, Heath-
cote et al. (2008) use CPS data to show that the average wage paid to men relative
to women for the period 1967{1980 was about 1.6, whereas between 1980 and 2000
this ratio averaged about 1.5. Second, women worked outside the home more after
1980. The data compiled by Francis and Ramey (2008) indicate that average weekly
hours worked per female over age 14 rose from 12.4 for the 1955{1980 period to 17.5
for the 1981{2000 period. In terms of our model, these changes imply a larger e®ec-
tive supply of labor per household. We model this as a change in the productivity
parameter A from 1 to 1.041.11
4.3 Discussion
It is helpful to brie°y describe household behavior in the model. Figure 6 displays the
housing service decision rule for a household in the young stage of life that rented in
11The 4.1% increase in productivity equals the ratio of population share weighted average weekly
pay for males and females in the second sub-sample relative to the ¯rst. The average pay is calculated
as follows: for the early sample, :47£30:28+:53£12:42=1:6 and for the later sample, :48£27:49+
:52 £ 17:2=1:5: The population shares are from the Census Bureau, the average hours worked per
male and female are from Francis and Ramey (2008), and the relative wages are from Heathcote
et al. (2008).
30Figure 6: Housing Decision of a Household that Rented in the Previous Period
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the previous period, under the 1980 calibration, \Low Income Risk," and with 1980
prices but income risk set according to the 2000 calibration, \High Income Risk."
The household's level of income is almost identical in both cases, so essentially the
only di®erence to the household's environment is the income risk it faces.12 On the
horizontal axis is the beginning of period level of net worth, a, and on the vertical
access is the housing service choice. Figure 7 shows the housing decision of the same
household except that it owned the smallest house, h; in the previous period. The
domain of assets considered in each ¯gure di®ers to highlight di®erent features of the
decision rules.
Consider the low risk case for a renter ¯rst. This shows that for assets less than
about a = 2 this household chooses to rent. The amount rented rises continuously
with wealth. Near asset level a = 2 this household switches from renting to owning
the minimum size house, h = 1:15: The tenure choice is not evident in the ¯gure, but
the household chooses to own all houses equal to or exceeding the smallest house.
12Due to the way the income process is constructed, increasing income risk changes the level of
income in each income state. Figure 6 displays the decision rules for the fourth highest income state
which turns out to be very close across the two cases.
31Due to the discreteness in house sizes and the transactions costs, there is an interval
of assets for which the minimum size house is still chosen. For assets of about a = 5,
the household's desired level of housing services increases. The step function form
of the policy rule continues to the right of a = 5. Another interesting feature of
the decision rule is that the jump in housing services from renting to the smallest
house is larger than the other jumps in the ¯gure. Similarly, the interval of assets
for which the household chooses to own the smallest house is wider than for larger
houses. These characteristics arise because the switch from renting to owning ends
the discounting due to renting which mitigates the transactions costs, while the other
switches only involve the transactions costs. Therefore, the household is willing to
incur the transactions cost of the move earlier than otherwise, that is with lower
net wealth.13 The basic form of the decision rule of this household holds for all
households in the model. All that changes are the asset cut-o® values determining
when the household selects a di®erent level of housing services.
The impact of raising income risk is to delay switching from renting to owning.
This is indicated in the ¯gure by the fact that the dashed line lies to the right of the
solid line. The rightward shift of the decision rule implies the household switches from
renting to owning at a higher level of assets in the high income risk case. These higher
assets take longer to accumulate on average and so higher income risk leads to delay
in acquiring the ¯rst house and, other things being equal, lower home ownership.
The intuition for this is straightforward. In the presence of proportional adjust-
ment costs and income risk, there is value to delaying the home purchase or sale until
the household is possibly wealthier and can a®ord a larger house. Higher income risk
increases the value of this option, thereby delaying home ownership and lowering the
home ownership rate. An increase in risk also raises the amount of precautionary
saving. Other things remaining the same, higher wealth eases the transition to home
ownership and so this e®ect should raise the home ownership rate. As we see in the
next section, at our calibrated parameter values the option value e®ect dominates the
precautionary saving e®ect.
In Figure 7 the household always chooses to own in both the low and high risk
13After the second housing service jump, the interval of assets for which the housing choice is ¯xed
gets larger as the size of the house increases. This is an artifact of the log linear manner in which
the housing grid was constructed.
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cases. Consequently the behavior of this household does not directly impact the home
ownership rate. However, Figure 7 illustrates another e®ect of raising income risk,
namely that it leads to delay in moving into larger houses. Note that for assets a < 10
the household chooses to continue owning the smallest house. When the household
enters the period with more assets, larger houses are chosen. Delay is indicated by
the fact that the asset level for which the switch to the next sized houses occurs is
higher in the high risk compared to low risk case. The intuition for this e®ect of
raising income risk is similar to before.
5 Findings
We now discuss the impact of structural change on the home ownership rates of the
young implied by our 1980 and 2000 calibrations. Table 7 displays home ownership
rates for the young age groups of interest in the U.S. data and under the stationary
equilibrium corresponding to each calibration. The empirical values for 1980 and
2000 are taken from Table 2.
33Table 7: Young Home Ownership in 1980 and 2000
Data Model
Age Group 1980 2000 Change 1980 2000 Change
25{29 43.4 36.0 -7.4 48.1 43.0 -5.1
30{34 60.7 53.0 -7.7 59.9 55.2 -4.7
35{39 69.7 63.4 -6.3 67.6 63.1 -4.5
40{44 74.3 69.1 -5.2 72.9 68.6 -4.3
25{44 60.6 57.3 -3.3 60.3 56.1 -4.2
It is clear from Table 7 that the model goes a long way toward accounting for
the reduction in home ownership rates by age and for the 25{44 category as a whole.
By age group our model accounts for 3/5{4/5 of the fall in home ownership and, as
in the data, the e®ects are larger for the younger age groups than for the older age
groups. The model implies a larger drop for the 25{44 age group than in the data,
but smaller drops for the individual age groups. The larger drop for the young group
as a whole is because the change in the age distribution in the model from 1980 to
2000 is not identical to the data, despite our attempt to take changes in the rate of
household formation into account.
Table 8 sheds light on the factors driving our model's ability to account for a
large fraction of the decline in young home ownership. This table displays di®erences
in home ownership by age between the 1980 calibration and versions of the 2000
calibration where just one of the ¯ve structural changes is imposed. In each case we
calculate the home ownership rates from the corresponding stationary equilibrium.
This table indicates that heightened income risk and delayed marriage are the driving
forces behind our ¯ndings. These e®ects lower the home ownership rate substantially
for each age group. Income risk lowers home ownership rates by age by between 3.37
and 4.59 percentage points. Marriage delay lowers the rates by between 1.58 and 3.98
percentage points. The reasons for heightened income risk lowering home ownership
were described at the end of the last section. Marriage delay lowers home ownership
mechanically since, as in the data, the non-married have lower home ownership rates
than the married in our model.
34Table 8: E®ects of Individual Structural Changes on Young Home Ownership
Down-payment Household Income Marriage Productivity
Age Group Constraint Formation Risk Delay Increase
25{29 0.20 0.69 -3.37 -3.98 4.87
30{34 0.22 0.54 -3.86 -3.08 4.50
35{39 0.21 0.33 -4.32 -2.26 3.92
40{44 0.19 0.13 -4.59 -1.58 3.37
25{44 0.20 0.80 -3.95 -2.83 4.28
The other factor having a large impact on home ownership is the productivity
increase. Recall that this is our way of modeling the higher wages and market work
of women after 1980. Not surprisingly higher productivity has a substantial positive
impact on home ownership. Still, when all the structural changes are incorporated,
the productivity increase is dominated by the e®ects of marriage delay and heightened
income risk.
Lowering the down-payment constraint has a small positive impact on home own-
ership. This is despite the fact that in the 1980 calibration 10% of those switching
from renting to owning are at the down-payment constraint and this percentage falls
to zero with the reduction in the down-payment constraint. Lowering the down-
payment even further has a very small additional e®ect on home ownership. That
relaxing credit constraints has a small impact on home ownership in our model does
not rule out the possibility that such constraints play an important role in cyclical
°uctuations.
The reduction in the rate of household formation also has a small positive impact
on home ownership. The lower rate of household formation raises the share of house-
holds in the family and retired stages compared to the young stage. This raises home
ownership because of the higher home ownership rates of the married and retired
compared to the young in the model. A side-e®ect of this change in the underlying
distribution of households is that wealth accumulation is greater and so the equilib-
rium interest rate is lower. The impact of the lower rate of household formation on
young home ownership is similar in magnitude to the e®ect of general equilibrium on
35the total impact of the structural changes on home ownership in the 2000 calibra-
tion. In particular, if we do not impose market clearing in the 2000 calibration and
keep the interest rate at its 1980 level, then home ownership rates would be about .5
percentage points lower.
6 Other Possible Explanations
We now address some other potential alternative explanations for the decline in young
home ownership. We consider changes in house prices, household mobility patterns,
tax policy and in°ation.
6.1 House Prices
House prices may be important for understanding the changes in home ownership,
either because of possible trends in the riskiness of houses as an asset, or because of
changes in price{rent ratios. If house price risk increased, then this would increase the
value of delaying a home purchase and lower home ownership. Aggregate measures of
house prices suggest that if there has been a trend, it has been toward less volatility
in real house prices.14 We suspect this is driven by the fact that consumer prices
now are less volatile than in 1980. Sinai and Souleles (2005) convincingly argue that
rent risk is more important than house price risk in the tenure choice decision. This
arises due to the role of housing as a hedge against variation in rental rates. If rent
risk were to decline, then there would be an incentive to substitute away from owned
toward rented housing. This is an intriguing possibility, but we leave it as an open
question for this paper.
A substantial rise in the price of an owner-occupied house relative to the cost of
rental housing should induce a shift away from owning toward renting. Piazzesi and
Schneider (2008) ¯nd that the price{rent ratio actually declined from 25 to 22 between
1980 and 2000. Still, the value of the ratio in 2000 was about where it had been in
the mid-1970s. Davis et al. (2008) ¯nd that the price{rent ratio was essentially the
14We have studied regional price indexes published by the Census Bureau, O±ce of Federal Hous-
ing Enterprise Oversight and Freddie Mac. We have been unable to obtain house prices for ¯ner
geographical classi¯cations, such as by city, that begin early enough for our purposes.
36same in 1980 and 2000. We conclude that there have not been large enough changes
in the price{rent ratio to have a material impact on home ownership.
6.2 Mobility
A second possible reason for a decline in ownership is that households' mobility rates
may have changed. If, for whatever reason, households were to move more frequently,
then, holding all else equal, this should lower home ownership due to the additional
costs involved with moving when a home is owned. In fact, mobility reports by
the Census Bureau point toward little change in mobility rates during the period in
question. For the young age groups we study in this paper, the probability that an
individual lives at a di®erent address from the previous year was 22% in the mid-1970s
and 20% in the mid-1990s.15
6.3 Tax Policy
One candidate for tax policy having an impact on home ownership is the 1986 tax
reform. Poterba (1992) postulates that the reductions in high income marginal tax
rates in 1986 lowered the bene¯ts to the mortgage interest tax deduction, thereby
lowering the incentive to own a home. While there is a direct e®ect of lowering the
top marginal tax rates on the tax implications of mortgage interest deductability, it
is far from clear that this translates into a substitution from owned to rental housing.
Gervais (2002) shows that even the elimination of mortgage interest deductibility
would have only modest consequences for home ownership. Similarly, Gervais and
Pandey (2008) argue that relatively high income families do not bene¯t from mortgage
interest deductibility nearly as much as conventionally believed when the family's
budget constraint is taken into account. There were other changes to the tax code
in 1986 which increased the incentive to build multi-family rental units. An increase
in the relative supply of rental housing should induce a substitution away from home
ownership. There was a brief period in the mid-1980s when investment in multi-family
units grew at a faster pace than single family homes. However, capital stock data
15This is based on the CPS and reported in various issues of \Geographical Mobility," a publication
of the Census Bureau.
37from the Bureau of Economic Analysis suggest that the overall e®ect on the relative
supply of rental housing was small.16
While there do not seem to have been any tax policy changes with a substantial di-
rect impact on home ownership, this does not discount the possibility that taxes have
played a role in lowering young home ownership. Consider the wedge between tax-
ation of owner-occupied housing and other capital. Both rental and owner-occupied
housing are subject to property taxes, but the service °ow from rental housing is
also subject to capital income taxes while it is not for owner-occupied housing. Non-
residential capital of course is subject to capital income taxes. Therefore, lowering
capital income taxes lowers the wedge between returns on housing and non-housing
assets, and therefore could lower the home ownership rate. There is evidence sup-
porting the view that capital income taxes fell between 1980 and 2000. Eichenbaum
and Fisher (2005) ¯nd that average capital taxes are generally lower after 1980 than
before. McGrattan and Prescott (2005) ¯nd that the same is true for measures of
average marginal capital taxes. While consistent with the decline in home ownership
among the young, the tax explanation seems hard to square with the increase in home
ownership among the old, on whom we should observe the greatest impact of changes
in capital taxes due to their higher wealth levels. So, while tax changes may help
explain the decline in young home ownership, any explanation involving taxes must
simultaneously account for the behavior of older households. We leave this to future
work.
6.4 In°ation
Piazzesi and Schneider (2008) document large swings in the share of owner-occupied
real estate in the portfolio of the U.S. household sector. Their ¯gure 2 indicates that
the share fell from 55% in 1952 to under 50% in the late 1960s, it grew to over 70%
by 1980, and declined back to its late 1960s values by 2000. Piazzesi and Schneider
(2008) argue that in°ation and in°ation expectations induced these swings in the
household sector's portfolio of assets. Their analysis does not say anything explicitly
16Changes to the tax code in 1998 a®ected the amount of capital gains on selling the primary
residence that is exempted from taxes. This should a®ect the timing of home sales and would make
ownership more desirable since the expected after-tax returns from owning are higher, which should
raise home ownership slightly.
38about home ownership, but it is suggestive. We think in°ation in the 1970s probably
had some role to play in the home ownership rate reaching such high levels in the
1980 Census. However, as with taxes, any explanation for home ownership trends
driven by in°ation must confront the fact that young and old households' ownership
trends di®er when there are similar incentive e®ects of in°ation.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we have documented a striking decline in home ownership among the
young between 1980 and 2000, a period when home ownership should have become
easier. We have established, using a calibrated equilibrium life-cycle model, that the
decline in young home ownership can be explained mostly by a slower rate of marriage
formation and heightened income risk. Part of the reason these factors are able to
account for the decline is that relaxing the down-payment constraint on mortgages
has a small impact on home ownership rates.
To our knowledge, our paper is the ¯rst to draw the connection between heightened
income risk and lower home ownership. We think it has important implications for
public policy. To the extent that heightened income risk is here to stay, then we should
expect aggregate home ownership rates to begin to decline going forward. If such a
decline is the optimal response of households to an increase in risk, then policy makers
should be wary of introducing market distortions to o®set the decline. On the other
hand, if high rates of home ownership are viewed as a desirable public policy objective,
for example as discussed in Glaeser and Shaprio (2002), then existing institutions and
regulations designed to boost home ownership will need to be rethought.
Our model abstracts from many interesting features of the tenure choice decision.
One important omission from our analysis is that we did not model marriage explicitly.
We think abstracting from marriage was justi¯ed for the purposes of this paper. Still,
many of the trends in home ownership seem connected to factors which have in°uenced
marriage. We think our model has shown the likely quantitative importance of some
of these factors and points toward the value of future research in this area.
39Appendix: Data Underlying Estimates of Aggregate Ratios
Except where noted, all expenditure data is from the National Income and Prod-
uct Accounts. The capital stock data are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis
publication, "Fixed Assets and Consumer Durable Goods."
² Output is measured as GDP plus the service °ow of consumer durables obtained
from the Federal Reserve Board.
² Non-residential capital includes producer durable equipment and non-residential
structures, plus the stock of consumer durables and the stock of non-residential
government capital.
² Residential capital is the stock of private and public residential capital.
² Owned residential capital is the stock of privately owned residential capital.
² Housing services are the °ow of housing services component of consumer expen-
diture on services.
² Consumption includes non-housing services plus non-durable expenditures plus
government consumption plus the service °ow from consumer durables.
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